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ing should not fall within the shelter of the privilege against
self-incrimination. If identification of a person by virtue
of evidence, the source and authenticity of which the observer knows without assistance from anyone, is -to be excluded, it must be done upon grounds other than the privilege
against self-incrimination. 19

PARLIAMENTARY LAW
THE CLOTURE RULE
At the beginning of the 81st Congress the Majority
leaders in the Senate, anticipating obstruction by "filibusters,"
proposed to amend the Senate Rules to provide for more ef-

fective limitation on debate. A motion was made to take up
19. If identification by virtue of compulsory voice exhibition is to
be disallowed, it must be done upon some other ground, such as:
(a) Undue prejudice. The principal case was decided purportedly
as a violation of the privilege. Yet, the court in obscure language,
indicates that the evidence should have been excluded solely because
the specific words'were uttered. If the particular words were such as
would rouse the passion of the jury, the evidence might be subject to
exclusion as unduly prejudicial (6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE: Sec. 1904); but
so far as the privilege itself is concerned, the undue prejudice argument
is irrelevant. Opposing exclusion on an undue prejudice basis is the
fact that the most accurate method of identification is to present the
suspect to the witness in as near as possible the same conditions as
originally observed. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE Sec. 786a. For valuable
discussion see Gorphe, F., Showing Prisoners To Witnesses for Identification, 1 AM. J. POLICE Sd. 79 (1930).
(b) Unreliability of the Identification. Relatively little research
appears to have been done in this area, but see: 27 J. CRIm. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY (1936); McGeehee, F., The Reliability of the Identification
of the Human Voice, 17 J. GEN. PSYCHOLOGY 249 (1937), and comment
thereon in 33 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 487 (1943); McGeehee, F.,
An Experimental Study of Voice Recognition, 31 J. GEN. PSYCHOLOGY
53 (1944). For cases accepting voice identification see 2 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE Sec. 660, n.1.
(c) Violation of procedural due process of the U. S. Const. Amend.
XIV. To date that evidence which has been excluded by virtue of
the due process clause has been only involuntary confessions. However
the scope of procedural due process does not appear to be limited
to confessions, in

view of its underlying policy:

".

.

. to prevent

fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false."
Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 62 Sup. Ct. 280, 86 L. Ed. 166
(1941); Watts v. Indiana, 69 Sup. Ct. 1347, 1348, n. 2 (1949). But
whether this due process fair trial rule will ever be utilized to compel
the exclusion of non-confessional evidence is an open question.
(d) Waiver. Many courts have avoided a determination of what
constitutes testimony by finding that the accused waived his privilege
when, as a matter of fact, he had no privilege to waive. E.g., People
v. Salas, 17 Cal. App.2d 75, 61 P.2d 771 (1936); State v. Watson,
114 Vt. 543, 49 A.2d 174 (1946); Spitler v. State, 221 Ind. 107, 46
N. E.2d 591 (1943); State v. Cash, 219 N. C. 818, 15 S. E.2d 277 (1941).

19491

RECENT CASES

a resolution,' which would amend the then ineffective Cloture
Rule. 2 Subsequent discussion on the motion eventually developed into a "filibuster." 3 In an attempt to preclude further debate, the Majority filed a cloture petition with the
Presiding Officer. A Member immediately made a "point of
order"-whether the Cloture Rule permitted such a petition
to be filed on a motion to take up a measure, as distinguished
from resolutions, bills and other business.4 Ruling on this
point of order, Vice President Barkley as President of the
Senate, held that the phrase "pending measure" in the Cloture
Rule includes any business before the Senate, including a
motion, and therefore a cloture petition could be filed in this
instance. 5 On appeal, the Senate body declined to sustain the
Chair's ruling, thereby negatively implying that Cloture could
not be applied to a motion.6 The unrestricted "filibuster"
1. This resolution was to amend the Cloture Rule by providing that
cloture petitions could be filed on motions or any other business before
the Senate. 95 CoNG. REC. 1355 (Feb. 17, 1949) and 95 CONG. REC. 1617
(Feb. 28, 1949).
2. The Senate adopted the Cloture amendment to Senate Rule XXII
on March 8, 1917, which reads:
"If at any time a motion, signed by sixteen Senators, to
bring to a close the debate upon any pending measure is presented to the Senate, the Presiding Officer shall state the motion to the Senate, and one hour after the Senate meets on the
following calendar day but one, he shall lay the motion before
the Senate and direct that the Secretary call the roll, and, upon
the ascertainment that a quorum is present, the Presiding Officer shall, without debate, submit to the Senate by an aye-andnay vote the question:
'Is it the sense of the Senate that the debate shall be
brought to a close?'
And if that question shall be decided in the affirmative by
a two-thirds vote of those voting, then said measure shall be the
unfinished business to the exclusion of all other business until
disposed of.
Thereafter no Senator shall be entitled to speak in all more
than one hour on the pending measure, the amendments thereto,
and motions affecting the same . .

."

(Italics added.)

SEN. J. 234, 64th Cong. 2d Sess. (1917) ; SENATE MANUAL, Sen. Doc. 172,
75th Cong. 3d Sess., pp. 27-28.
3. The Southern opposition to the "Civil Rights" legislation culminated in the "filibuster" on the motion to change the Senate rules, which
was the first step in a maneuver to insure passage of the legislation.
4. 95 CONG. REC. 2216 (March 10, 1949).
5. See 95 CONG. REC. 2217-18 (March 10, 1949) for the complete
Barkley ruling.
6. The Senate vote on the point of order was 46 to 41 in favor of
reversing the Chair. The Senate body is the ultimate authority as the
Constitution states that "Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings... " Art. I, § 5. For all practical purposes therefore, the
Senate rules mean only what the majority say they mean.
See II HIND'S PRECEDENTS OF THE HousE Or REPRESENTATIVES
§ 1340 (1907), for Chair's authority to rule and right of appeal.
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was then resumed, until urgent business necessitated a solution to the dilemma in the form of a compromise amendment.7
In any body regulated by parliamentary procedure a
proper balance must be struck between summary action by
the majority in complete disregard of the minority rights
and failure of action desired by the majority resulting from
obvious dilatory debate. Sufficient discussion should be allowed to manifest the merits and defects of a particular issue,
but curtailed before becoming an organ of obstruction.8 The
most common device to effectuate this balance is the "previous
question" rule, 9 which originated in the Parliament of England,1° and is now employed in our House of Representatives. 1
In its simplest form the rule consists merely of a motion to
vote on the pending issue without further discussion, which
can be carried by the vote of two-thirds of the body.
In the Senate a Cloture Rule has been used to restrict
unwarranted discussion since 1917. Prior to that time, excepting temporary use of the "previous question" and other
restrictions, the Members possessed the privilege of unlimited
debate. 12 The nature of the Senate and the high caliber of
its Members differentiated it from the House and other parliamentary bodies and indicated that a definite rule for limitation would not be required. However, on numerous occasions
this privilege was flagrantly abused by a few Senators to
promote their cause at the expense of detering all action by
7. After a Southern Democrat-Republican coalition, an amendment
to the rule was accomplished which permitted Cloture on any matter,
except a motion for a change in the rules, by a vote of two-thirds of the

full Senate. The Rule as amended established effective Cloture, the

desire of the Majority, but at the price of making it more difficult to
invoke. Previously Cloture required only two-thirds of those voting,
while under the new rule two-thirds of the complete Senate is necessary.
Now a Senator absent or not voting in effect votes against Cloture.
95 CONG. REc. 2768-73 (Mar. 17, 1949).

This is significant as a step away from the goal of majority Cloture

advocated as one measure to improve the Senate Rules. See Should
Debate in the Senate be FurtherLimited, 5 CONG. DIGEST 291 (1926).
8. See CUSHING, LAW AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES
304-316 (1863); LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE ch. I; WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION, pp. 316-318.
9. See V HIND'S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OF THE UNITED STATES § 5443 (1907).

10. Id. at § 5445.
11. Id. at H8 5456, 5446; and VIII CANNON'S PRECEDENTS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 2661 (1921).
12. See HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED

(1938); VIII CANNON, ,Op. cit. supra note 11 § 2663.

STATES,

p. 392
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the Majority. 3 To alleviate this abuse, a determined Senate,
intent upon preventing the use of dilatory practices during
the national emergency of World War I,- adopted a Cloture

amendment to the Senate Rules providing for a limitation
upon debate of any "pending measure" when two-thirds of
the voting Senators so desired.15

In later sessions of the Senate, experience revealed two
major weaknesses which threatened to undermine the application of the Cloture Rule.' 6 The first, appearing in 1922,
arose in connection with the approval of the Journal, at the

beginning of each legislative day, which was at that time
a privileged question holding priority in the order of busi-

ness.' 7 Rulings held that Cloture was inapplicable to such a
motion.' s The second and more serious flaw became evident
when rulings from the Chair apparently held that Cloture
could not be applied to a motion to take up a measure, for it
was not a "pending measure" as that phrase is employed in
the Cloture Rule. 9

The consequences of the development of these flaws in
the Cloture Rule was that the Senate, in effect, had no limita13. HAYNES, op. cit. supra note 12, ch. VIII; BURDETTE, FILIBUsTERING IN THE SENATE, chs. II and III (1940) ; WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. note 8,
at p. 486 (1934) ; Legislative History of the Cloture Rules in the Senate,
92 CONG. REC. 638 (1946); Potterf, Limitation of Debate in the United
States Senate: A Phase of the Law-Making Process, 1 IND. L. J. 139;
VIII CANNON op. cit. supra note 11 § 2666-2670. For a series of articles exploring the merits, pro and con, of limitations of debate, see
Moses, The Senate and Its Rules 198 Sat. Eve. Post (June 27, 1925);
DAWES, Reform of the Senate Rules, 198 Sat. Eve. Post 3 (Nov. 28,
1925); Moses, Speaking of the Senate, 204 Sat. Eve. Post 8 (July 25,

1931).
14. Filibusters on the Armed Ship bill indicated to the Senate the
need of a cloture amendment. Subsequent history of the Cloture Rule is
found inBURDETTE, op. cit. supra note 13, ch. V; Pepper, Senate Cloture,
74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 131 (1925); Galloway, Limitation of Debate in the
United States Senate, Public Affairs Bulletin No. 64 (Oct. 1948);
Should Debate in the Senate be FurtherLimited, 5 CONG. DIGEST 291
(1926).
An excellent collection of discussions, speeches, and other material
relating to limitation on debate in the Senate is found in Hearinqs before the Committee on Rules and Administration of the United States
Senate, SEN. Doc. No. 10, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. (1949).
15. See note 2 supra.

16. HAYNES, .,p. cit. supra note 12, at 402.
17. The practice arose as a construction of Senate Rule III, ...
the
Journal of the preceding day shall be read, and any mistakes made in
the entries corrected . .. and when any motion shall be made to amend
or correct the same, it shall be deemed a privileged question, and proceeded with until disposed of." SENATE MANUAL p. 6, 75th Cong. 3d
Sess.
I
18. E.g. see 63 CoNG. REC. 325, 388, 438, 446 (1922).
19. See 58 CONG. REC. 8413, 8547, 8554 (1918) ; 68 CONG. REc. 4900,
4903, 4975, 4981, 4985, 5167 (1927); 92 CONG. Rsc. 802, 871, 883, 951,
1037 (1946); and 94 CONG. REc. 9752 (Aug. 2, 1948).
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tion on debate. As in the case of other parliamentary bodies,
procedure in the Senate requires most business to be initiated
by a motion,20 including the approval of the Journal at the
beginning of each new legislative day. If business can be
deadlocked at this stage, then the vulnerability of the Senate's
procedure to "filibusters" is patent.21 This was the status
of the Cloture Rule when Vice President Barkley ruled that
a cloture petition could be filed on a motion as a "pending
measure."
The reasons for the Senate's failure to sustain Barkley's
ruling was explained by the Senate's Rules Committee.? It
contended that prior rulings held that a cloture petition could
not be applied to a motion and necessitated a ruling by
Barkley of a similar nature.2 3 However, the Senate did concede that the prior rulings were erroneous interpretations,
in the sense that they abrogated the creating Senate's "intent"
to provide for an effective limitation on debate by gutting
the Cloture Rule.2 4 The Senate proposed to correct these rul5
2

ings by amendment.
20.

HAYNES,

op. cit. supra note 12, at 374; GILFRY, PRECEDENTS OF

THE UNITED STATES SENATE, p. 487 (1909).

21. The instant situation is a splendid example of this vulnerability;
for as Cloture could not be used to stop the "filibuster" on the motion to
take up the resolution changing the rules, business was curtailed until
one side acquiesced. The Southern-Democrats formed a coalition with
the Republican minority, and then terminated the "filibuster," being
assured of sufficient votes to allow only a favorable amendment to pass.
22. The Committee's position is found in a report accompanying a
resolution to amend the Cloture Rule. See SEN. REPORT 69, 81st Cong.
1st Sess. (1949).
23. The Committee apparently had not sufficiently scrutinized the
prior rulings to discover that they covered the point of order only by
dicta.
For discussions of why Cloture may not be applied to a motion see
speeches by Senators Saltonstall in 95 CoNG. REC. 2214 (Mar. 10, 1949),
and Vandenberg in 94 CONG. REc. 9753 (Aug. 2, 1948), 95 CONG. Ruc.
2274 (Mar. 10, 1949). Contra: Senator Lucas, 95 CoNG. REC. 2210
(Mar. 10, 1949).
24. The Rules Committee stated: "The fact that over five years
elapsed before the first flaw in the cloture provisions of Rule XXII
was developed and that a much longer time expired before a second serious flaw was discovered is a definite indication that every Senator who
voted to amend Rule XXII in 1917 did so with a clear understanding
that he was voting for an enforceable rule to close debate and not to
produce a result, as Mr. Vanderberg stated, 'That, in the final analysis,
the Senate has no effective cloture rule at all . ...'
"That such a result was not intended... [because] no statement by
any Senator who was a Member of the Senate in 1917 has been found
which would indicate. . . he was aware that the rule had loopholes in it
which made it of no value as a means of bringing debate to an end.
There is no evidence to show that any one of them was aware that the
rule would prove to be ineffective and that he supported it with any
mental reservations or any purpose of evasion." SEN. REP. 69, 81st
Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2. (1949).
25. See note 7 supra.
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When the question of interpretation was put before the
Chair by a "point of order," Barkley found that there had
never been a direct ruling on whether cloture petition could
apply to a motion. Therefore, as the apparent precedents
were not in point in this instance, it was free to rule that a
motion falls within the purview of the term "pending
measure" and is subject to Cloture.26 There were four previous
relevant interpretations of the Rule, which were responsible
for the flaws and had been established as apparent precedent.
A clear analysis of these rulings reveals that in each instance
there had been some other business before the Senate which
was determined to be the pending measure to which Cloture
applies, instead of the motion on which the Cloture petition
was filed.27 It is thus evident that the cloture petition was
out of order because it was not, rather than because it could
not be filed on a motion constituting the "pending measure."
As these prior rulings were not in point, but could be distinguished away, the Chair was not bound by parliamentary
precedent, but completely free to rectify erroneous dicta presented in former decisions.28 The Senate was not warranted
then in its refusal to sustain the Chair's ruling.
26. See note 5 supra.
27. The distinguishment is essentially as follows: In the first ruling
a cloture petition was filed on the amendments to the Treaty, whereas
the Treaty itself was the unfinished business before the Senate, thus
cloture action on the amendments were out of order. See 58 CONG. REC.
3413, 8547 and 8554 (1919).
In the second ruling by Dawes, the cloture petition was again not
filed on a measure under consideration by the Senate. See 68 CONG.
REC. 4900, 4903, 4975, 4981, 4985, 5167 (1927).
A motion to amend the Journal, being a privileged question, had
replaced the Fair Employment Practices Commission Bill on which a
cloture petition was filed, thus cloture was not filed on the pending
business in the McKellar ruling. See 92 CONG. REC. 802.
The Vandenberg ruling, which clearly expresses the position contra
to the Barkley holding, involved a situation in which an aviation bill was
the business before the Senate, or pending measure. A motion was made
to consider an anti-poll-tax bill. Then a petition for Cloture was filed
on the anti-poll-tax bill. A Member raised a point of order which the
Chair sustained by deciding that the motion to take up the anti-Doll-tax
bill could not be entertained until the Senate had disposed of the aviation bill. Thus both the motion for the anti-poll-tax bill and the cloture
petition filed on it were out of order. However, the Chair unnecessarily
added, to rule on the point of order, that "pending measure" as used in
the Cloture Rule did not include a motion. See 94 CONG. REC. 9752 (Aug.
2, 1948).
28. Even Vandenberg concedes this in his ruling, "There has been
no direct ruling upon the specific question whether a motion to take up
a bill is subject to cloture. It has been recognized and understood that
such is not the case, on the grounds that a motion cannot reasonably be
construed to be a pending measure within the meaning of the cloture
rule," 94 CONG. REC. 9752 (Aug. 2, 1948).
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Nor was the Senate correct in concluding that an amendment was necessary to rectify this situation. Even assuming
the prior rulings were in point in the present instance, the
Senate's position requiring amendment is unsound as a means
of remedying the defective rule. The proper method would be
to allow the Chair to exercise its prerogative to overruling
the decisions of clearly erroneous interpretations. 29 This
would be in accord with a well recognized exception to the
doctrine of Stare Decisis-interpretations as precedent which
defeat the very purpose of the rules and are plainly wrong
should be freely overruled.3 0
In finding prior rulings binding on the Chair the Senate
erred, and in requiring amendment to erase previous erroneous interpretations the Senate sacrificed the principles of
parliamentary law in favor of political expediency.

TAXATION
TRANSFERS INTENDED TO TAKE EFFECT
AT OR AFTER DEATH
In the recent case of Spiegel's Estate v. Comm'r, 335
U. S. 701 (1949), the United States Supreme Court held
that application of the "intended to take effect at ... death"

provision of § 811 (c)

1

of the Internal Revenue Code to an

29. Senator Vandenberg expresses the opposition to such a proposal:
"If the Senate wishes to cure this impotence it has the authority, the
power, and the means to do so. The President pro tempore of the Senate
does not have the authority, the power or the means to do so except as
he arbitrarily takes the law into his own hands." 94 CONG. REC. 9753
(Aug. 2, 1948).
For reference to the powers and duties of the Chair see: WLLOUGHBY, Op. cit. supra note 8 at 532; LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE, chs. XIX
and XX (1922); CUSHING, .p. cit. supra note 8, at pp. 110-115, 567-572;
HATCH & SHOUP, A HISTORY OF THE VICE-PRESIDENCY OF THE UNITED
STATES ch. VI (1934); GILFRY, PRECEDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
SENATE,

p. 448 (1909).

Examples of other "constructive rulings," where the Chair followed
principles of policy rather than precedent, see 55 CONG. REC. 2436 (1919),
and WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 8 at 482; VIII CANNON, op. iLt.
supra note 11, at § 2424.
See also VI CANNON, op. cit. supra note 11, at § 48, where the Chair
followed precedent although he could find no intrinsic reason for sustaining the point of order.
30. WELL, RES ADJUDICATA AND STARE DECISIS, ch. XLV and p. 545
(1878); BLACK, LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT, p. 199 (1912).
1. "The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined
by including the value at the time of his death of all property... to the

